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Theme1: The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the launch of the European 
External Action Service are an opportunity to introduce reporting and assessment 
mechanisms to render CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions more 
democratically legitimate and accountable. 
 
 
Summary: Now that the Lisbon Treaty is in force, European Presidencies no longer need 
to continue promoting CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions as they did 
in the past, but they do need to articulate new measures that will consolidate them in the 
future. While the missions have served as a laboratory for the gradual development of the 
EU’s procedures and civilian and military crisis management bodies, they have not been 
subject to critical assessment and monitoring processes as stringent as have been 
established in some countries. This ARI sustains that in future the CSDP missions will not 
be able to rely on such a tolerant framework and that they will be subject to more criticism 
and more thorough evaluation. Consequently, the forthcoming Presidencies must start 
implementing mechanisms to strengthen the legitimacy and transparency of the CSDP 
missions and prevent European citizens and their representatives in the European 





The EU has launched 24 CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions since 
2003, but very little is known about them. The information available from open sources is 
limited to the information provided by the Council through its website, and only in the last 
few years have external valuations begun to appear. Compared to the uncritical and 
complacent descriptions of official reports, independent evaluations coincide in pinpointing 
common deficiencies in the missions. Among others, they point to a lack of strategy in the 
mandates, their limited results when it comes to solving the underlying problems, the 
democratic deficit in their management, the difficulty in coordinating interventions, the 
difference in strategic cultures among member states and the lack of military planning 
capacity. 
 
Now that the Lisbon Treaty is in force, European Presidencies no longer need to continue 
promoting CSDP missions as they did in the past, but they do need to articulate new 
measures that will consolidate them in the future. As well as improving the operating and 
doctrinal aspects of the missions, future Presidencies will have to turn their attention to 
two structural conditioning factors linked to their affordability and accountability. While the 
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missions have served as a laboratory for the gradual development of the EU’s procedures 
and civilian and military crisis management bodies, they have not been subject to critical 
assessment and monitoring processes as stringent as have been established in some 
countries. This work sustains that in future the CSDP missions will not be able to rely on 
such a tolerant framework and that they will be subject to more criticism and more 
thorough evaluation. Consequently, the forthcoming presidencies must start implementing 
mechanisms to strengthen the legitimacy and transparency of the CSDP missions and 
prevent European citizens and their representatives in the European Parliament from 
becoming distanced from them. 
 
Reasons for Concern about the Missions’ Affordability 
The number and international demand for CSDP missions have not continued to grow due 
to the proliferation of crises and the European aim of contributing to international 
governance, discharging its responsibility to protect and providing humanitarian aid as a 
global security player. However, the resources available to the EU do not live up to these 
expectations, while new needs are constantly arising and priorities must be set. As the 
2008 report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy of 2003 highlighted, 
the EU must ‘prioritise [its] commitments, in line with resources’. The concept of 
affordability refers to undertaking only those missions that can actually be conducted and 
that, furthermore, produce the expected results in terms of acceptable cost and efficiency. 
Affordability means earmarking expenses in accordance with the global priorities and 
resources of the CSDP and CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). 
 
Experience shows that the political support for CSDP missions is out of step with the 
contributions to launch them because the very same member states that approve the 
missions are not obliged to provide the necessary resources to actually implement them. 
Several of the missions approved in Brussels have seen their roll-out delayed because 
they did not have the necessary resources (Concordia, EUFOR Chad/Car, EULEX 
Kosovo and EUPOL Afghanistan), while others were deployed quickly due to the 
sponsorship of some states (Artemis Congo, EU NAVFOR Atalanta and EUMM Georgia). 
The practical consequence is that despite appearing to be acting collectively, the EU 
actually acts like a coalition of the willing in which the available means and participants 
define the mission. 
 
Most of the official evaluations highlight the EU’s capacity to implement missions requiring 
comprehensive management because it has a range of civilian and military instruments 
which other players do not have. However, some evaluations question this comparative 
advantage because many missions have experienced difficulties in assembling military, 
civilian and financial resources. European Defence Agency data show that the difference 
in military capabilities between member states continues to increase and unless future 
Presidencies make real efforts to introduce convergence criteria there will be increasingly 
fewer countries able to operate jointly. Presidencies should also keep up their efforts to 
achieve the civilian and military headline goals set. These goals were not achieved by the 
2003 and 2010 deadlines, while resources have been launched such as the EU 
Battlegroups which have so far not been used in CSDP missions. 
 
The EU has shown a greater capacity to generate civilian capabilities in technical, 
development and humanitarian aid missions, but not in missions like those of Kosovo and 
Afghanistan which required sizeable police contingents or in missions to reform the 
security sector in complex scenarios such as Guinea Bissau and Somalia (perhaps this 
explains why missions like EUJUST LEX Iraq, EUSEC DR Congo and EUTM Somalia do 
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not even feature on the Council’s website). Similarly, experience shows that peace-
building and nation-building missions require more resources, strategic patience and 
management capacity to achieve results than the EU can provide. 
 
The funding of these missions is yet another source of uncertainty. Civilian missions can 
be funded using CFSP funds (€327 million for 2011), but this is barely 3%-4% of the total 
EU external affairs budget. In military operations, the States involved take up most of the 
expenses (costs lie where they fall), except for some common costs covered by the 
Athena mechanism and others to launch the operations but which only cover 
approximately 10% of the real expense. Despite the financing mechanisms and the 
budget increase applicable to CSDP missions, the funds are insufficient and their 
management by the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Services 
needs to be rendered more coherent. 
 
The reliance on national military, civilian and financial contributions gives major European 
countries an extraordinary power to reject those missions or mechanisms that oblige them 
to make significant contributions (Germany and Sweden in EUFOR Chad) or to demand –
in exchange for their contributions– the control of the decision-making process and a 
more prominent role and greater visibility in the missions (France contributed 53% of 
EUFOR Chad/CAR’s troops). 
 
Presidencies must aim for synchronisation between the political decision-making 
processes, operation planning and the generation of forces, so that missions are not 
approved unless the necessary resources are guaranteed. When synchronisation has 
worked, it has been possible to conduct missions as demanding as the Concordia mission 
in the Balkans and Atalanta in the Horn of Africa. But when common decision-making has 
underestimated the availability of resources, either it has not been possible to deploy the 
missions (Darfur), or they have been delayed (it took six months to assemble 16 
helicopters and 10 transport aircraft for EUFOR Chad/CAR) or they have been deficient, 
as was the case of Kosovo and Afghanistan. Presidencies must also continue to support 
initiatives like permanent structural cooperation, the division of tasks, functional 
specialisation, the pooling of resources and outsourcing, which can increase collective 
resources and reduce the dependence on individual countries. 
 
In a Europe where citizen welfare is being scaled down and where many are questioning 
their governments’ decisions to intervene in international missions, Presidencies must 
focus on streamlining the EU’s intervention criteria. The influence of an international 
player is not gauged by the number of missions it conducts but by the results that are 
achieved. Presidencies must help change the mentality of those in charge of the missions 
in order to shift the focus to mission quality and not quantity. The EU must take advantage 
of the emergence of new global and regional players to share with them the 
responsibilities of international security, within the complementary framework advocated 
by a comprehensive approach. 
 
Reasons to Demand Accountability in Respect of the Missions 
European governments are finding it increasingly difficult to justify to their own citizens 
their involvement in international security missions, especially those where costs do not 
translate into results. Because of the need to secure and maintain political and social 
support for these missions, many countries have established democratic supervision 
mechanisms to authorise involvement in international initiatives. These mechanisms apply 
mainly to military missions, but they have increased the influence of parliamentary 
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debates and opinion polls in the approval of and continued involvement in missions. The 
general tendency of governments asking for prior approval before sending troops abroad 
forces them to justify the reasons for their involvement in such missions, the goals thereof, 
results obtained and human, material and financial resources necessary to implement 
them. 
 
It is true that not all 27 EU member states have accountability mechanisms, that these 
mechanisms vary from one country to another and that they are all in the test phase. But it 
is also true that they have become widespread and that the governments which were 
previously opposed to being scrutinised are now benefiting from the support and 
legitimacy it affords them. At EU level, there are not yet similar mechanisms in place due 
to the democratic shortfall of the CSDP in general, and missions are not subject to public 
scrutiny. However, it will not be long before societies and parliaments that are used to 
demanding accountability from their governments with regard to missions start insisting on 
the same from Brussels, so it would be a good idea if the next presidencies began 
preparing the institutions and changing the procedures so as to improve accountability. 
 
A first step would be to increase the information available regarding the status, results and 
lessons learned from the missions. Official civilian and military evaluations do not filter 
down to civilian society and the constraints on open information are compounded by the 
lack of methodological instruments for assessing CFSP missions, hampering self-criticism 
and learning. Accordingly, it would be advisable for the next Presidencies to present 
initiatives to boost the information flow and develop more transparent evaluation 
mechanisms and indicators. This would enable them to increase the interaction between 
national parliaments and the European Parliament, Europeanising the defence 
commissions, in order to foster greater social involvement, as suggested by the EU 
Institute for Security Studies. 
 
Until now, most CSDP missions have lacked a strategy clearly marking out the EU's vital 
interests and priorities at play, the strategic objectives, resources needed and how these 
resources will be used. European public opinion and MEPs do not have that information 
because the available public documents are too general and the concepts of crisis 
management and operation plans (OPLANS) are confidential. Without having access to 
these aspects, it is very difficult to know why missions are approved and what strategic 
effects they have. Neither are there efficient reporting mechanisms for MEPs to receive 
this kind of information confidentially, since governments avoid being accountable to the 
European Parliament by arguing that they are accountable to their own national 
parliaments, and they avoid being accountable to the latter by arguing that the decisions 
are taken in Brussels. As a result, in the EU, missions are as likely to be as out of step 
with societies as they already are in member states, and the way to prevent this is for 
those responsible for the missions to provide transparent and systematic accounts of the 
results of the missions. 
 
Conclusion: The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the launch of the European 
External Action Service are an opportunity to introduce reporting and assessment 
mechanisms to render CSDP missions more democratically legitimate and accountable 
than now. The European Parliament now has a greater capacity to supervise and interact 
with the High Representative and the European External Action Service, for them to 
provide more information on missions financed with European funds or responding to 
requests from the President of the Parliament or the External Affairs Committee 
concerning the CFSP. The European Parliament also receives periodical reports and can 
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draft non-binding recommendations with the information received during visits, hearings 
and open sources. However, European institutions have little capacity to demand 
accountability from those responsible for CSDP missions whose financing and resources 
come from governmental sources. 
 
Consequently, and although it hardly seems logical to ask Presidencies to promote 
transparency and supervision of the intergovernmental system, they must do exactly that, 
because establishing a European open evaluation system would help European citizens 
identify better with the CSDP missions and would nurture Europe’s strategic culture. In a 
strategic context such as that of the next few years, in which the available resources will 
shrink, there will be no shortage of people questioning the wisdom of the EU continuing to 
expand the number and complexity of CSDP missions without those responsible for 
managing them being asked to provide explanations with regard to their goals and results. 
As well as official assessment mechanisms, a more open and transparent evaluation 
system must be implemented to enable governments and institutions to share the lessons 
learned with MEPs and civil society. Furthermore, the implementation of such a 
mechanism would help advance towards monitoring procedures based on the best 
national practices and strengthen democratic supervision by national parliaments since 
they would be able to verify the information they receive from their governments against 
the information received from Brussels. 
 
Since this is a long-term process, the immediate steps for Presidencies should be aimed 
at creating evaluation, supervision and communication instruments that affect CSDP 
missions that do not have a significant military component. Presidencies must try to put an 
end to the current dilution of responsibilities throughout the institutional universe and the 
various decision-making levels and start defining and personalising responsibilities. In the 
long term, in order to do the same with military missions, presidencies must foster 
cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments in order to 
consolidate the principles of accountability and accessibility, regulate open or classified 
information systems, harmonise the evaluation procedures and methodologies and 
promote the strategic communication of European leaders with regard to CSDP missions. 
Now that Presidencies have lost much of their prominence in CSDP missions, their work 
must be aimed at consolidating the missions by fostering the EU's credibility and efficacy 
as a leading player in global security. 
 
In summary, Presidencies must: (1) recast their role in CSDP missions towards 
monitoring and supervision; (2) introduce intervention criteria to synchronise political 
decision-making, operations planning and generation of resources (affordability); and (3) 
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